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I. INTRODUCTION
On August 2, 2004, President George W. Bush signed the United States-
Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA)' between the United States
and the Central American countries of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic.2 Despite heated
congressional debate, CAFTA was expeditiously passed, albeit narrowly, in
both the House of Representatives and the Senate.3 Similar to previous free
trade agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA),4 CAFTA is designed to eliminate tariffs and barriers to trade while
opening markets between the participating countries and promoting foreign
investment.' Proponents have touted CAFTA as a necessary step towards
President Bush's ultimate goal of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA):
a free trade agreement that would potentially include thirty-four economies
within the Western Hemisphere.6
Proponents of CAFTA and free trade in general contend that free trade
facilitates development and investment in countries, which ultimately leads to
enhanced protection of the environment. However, CAFTA has received an
onslaught of criticism from environmental groups who believe CAFTA only
increases the threat to the environment and natural resources. Among various
weaknesses in free trade agreements like CAFTA, opponents point to the lack
of environmental considerations in the agreement. Also, CAFTA provides an
opportunity for foreign investors to undermine existing domestic
environmental regulations in CAFTA countries. Criticism asserting that
David Armstrong, CAFTA Signed into Law: Bush Hails Trade Pact After Tough Fight in
Congress, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 3,2005, at Cl, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.
cgi?f-=/c/a/2005/08/03/BUGSFE 1 S5G1 .DTL&hw=CAFTA&sn=002&sc=378.
2 Central America Free Trade Agreement, May 28, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 514 (2004), available
athttp://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-DRFinalTexts/Section
Index.html [hereinafter CAFTA].
3 See Armstrong, supra note 1 (reporting that CAFTA passed in the Senate fifty-four to
forty-five and narrowly escaped rejection in the House by a 217 to 215 vote).
' North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 1.L.M. 289
(1993) [hereinafter NAFTA], available at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/indexe.
aspx?DetailID=78.
' See Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), CAFTA, http://www.wola.org/
economic/cafta.htm (last visited June 3, 2007) [hereinafter WOLA, CAFTA].
6 BEN LILuSTON, INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POL'Y, CAFTA's IMPACT ON U.S. ETHANOL
MARKET 11 (2005), available at http://www.tradeobservatory.org/library.cfm?refid=73232
(noting U.S. Trade Representative Robert Portman has called CAFTA the "gateway" to the
FTAA).
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CAFTA provisions inadequately address environmental concerns is largely
based on the alleged failures of prior free trade agreements, most notably
NAFTA.
This Note addresses CAFTA's potential impact on the environment and
domestic environmental laws. In the process, this Note evaluates the adequacy
with which CAFTA addresses environmental concerns by including provisions
which may offset any negative impact free trade has on the environment.
Specifically, this Note analyzes the effectiveness of CAFTA's environmental
chapter in addressing the potential negative effects CAFTA may have on the
environment of its Central American countries. Also, this Note addresses
whether CAFTA's investor suit provisions in Chapter 10 of the agreement are
an improvement to NAFTA's similar Chapter 11.
This Note is not necessarily a comprehensive, comparative analysis of
CAFTA and NAFTA, nor is there a specific determination of whether NAFTA
was a success for the environments of the United States, Canada, or Mexico.
Yet the relation between NAFTA, CAFTA, and the environment is quite
relevant. In evaluating CAFTA's potential impact on the environment,
NAFTA can provide insight into CAFTA's environmental provisions and its
strengths and weaknesses since CAFTA is a new free trade agreement modeled
after NAFTA.
II. FREE TRADE'S POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE ENVIRONMENT
In addressing environmental concerns with free trade, proponents of free
trade agreements have historically argued that the reduction of trade barriers
and the encouragement of investment in different nations improves economies,
which ultimately results in the enhanced protection of the environment and
preservation of a country's natural resources.7 In arguing for free trade
agreements such as CAFTA, the United States Trade Representative (USTR)
stated that "[b]y fostering economic growth and job creation, investment can
7 See, e.g., UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW OF
THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC - CENTRAL AMERICA - UNITED STATES FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 29
(2005), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/asset_
upload file953_7901 .pdf [hereinafter CAFTA FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW]; COMM'N FOR
ENVTL. COOPERATION OF NORTH AMERICA (CEC), FREE TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE
PICTuRE BECOMES CLEARER 1 (2002), available at http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/Economy/
FreeTrade-en-fin.pdf [hereinafter CEC, FREE TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT] (stating "economic
theory generally holds.., that economic growth nurtures ... higher levels of environmental
protection...").
2007]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
bring important benefits, including potential benefits to the environment: as
wealth grows and poverty decreases, more resources become available for
environmental protection, with potential benefits for developing countries,
particularly as they develop constituencies in favor of increased environmental
protection."' In reference to its support of CAFTA, the USTR stated in its
final review of CAFTA that the agreement "can have positive environmental
consequences in Central America ... by reinforcing efforts to effectively
enforce environmental laws, accelerating economic growth and development
through trade and investment and disseminating environmentally beneficial
technologies."9
In general, environmentalists and opponents of free trade agreements have
vigorously argued that free trade agreements do not afford sufficient
consideration to the environmental consequences of free trade, but rather focus
on trade policy and the satisfaction of corporate interests.l0 Moreover, despite
the strong voice of substantial international coalitions of professional and
grassroots organizations against free trade, environmental interests are not
adequately represented at the bargaining table. For example, during the
debates leading up to the approval of CAFTA, its supporters relied on only one
gesture of support by environmental organizations: a January 2005 letter
signed by ten environmental non-governmental organizations from Central
America praising CAFTA." In 2002, the Commission for Environmental
Cooperation of North America addressed the lack of representation of
environmental interests in the free trade process:
8 CAFTA FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW, supra note 7, at 29.
9 Id. at 2.
'0 See CEC, FREE TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 7, at 4.
" Compare Dominican Republic-CentralAmerica Free Trade Agreement: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Energy and Commerce
Comm., 109th Cong. 21 (2005) (statement of Regina K. Vargo, Assistant United States Trade
Representative) [hereinafter Vargo, CAFTA Hearing], with Deborah James, Environmental
Impacts of CAFTA, GLOBAL EXCHANGE, http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/cafta/
Environment.html (last visited June 3, 2007) ("Most environmental organizations in the United
States have written letters to the U.S. Trade Representative and members of the U.S. Congress,
voicing their opposition to CAFTA. Groups as diverse as Center for International Environmental
Law, Defenders of Wildlife, Earthjustice, Friends of the Earth... have sounded out a warning
about CAFTA's negative potential impact on our shared environment. And in Central America,
over 800 social organizations -- including many environmental groups -- signed a petition in July
of 2004 urging the U.S. Congress to reject CAFTA.").
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The integration of environmental and trade policies remains
weak . . . [and] [t]he logic of integration remains fairly
straightforward: as long as environmental considerations remain
outside of, or external to, economic priorities-serving as little
more than a policy appendage or after-thought to core economic
decisions-then the world will find itself increasingly lurching
from one ecological problem to the next.
12
III. CAFTA AND THE ENVIRONMENT: POTENTIAL NEGATIVE EFFECTS IN
CENTRAL AMERICA
Since CAFTA's inception, environmental organizations have been
overwhelmingly against it. During the discussions and debates leading up to
its signing, CAFTA's potential negative impact on each country's environment
was one of the most controversial issues concerning the agreement.
Environmental concerns are based largely on the alleged failure of NAFTA to
protect the environments of participating countries from increased trade.
CAFTA opponents argue that the agreement has failed to adequately address
the detrimental environmental effects of free trade experienced under NAFTA.
Deborah James, Global Economy Director at the international human rights
organization Global Exchange, has described free trade agreements such as
CAFTA as "generally little more than code words for corporate expansion
across the globe at the expense of communities and our environment."' 3
Although CAFTA ensures that "[t]he Parties recognize the importance of
strengthening capacity to protect the environment and to promote sustainable
development in concert with strengthening trade and investment relations,"' 4
environmental groups argue CAFTA will weaken existing environmental
regulation in Central American countries seeking to attract foreign
investment.15 Due to the vast differences in the economies and environmental
regulations of the United States and Central American countries, CAFTA may
have a disproportionate detrimental impact to the environment of Central
America, while posing a much less severe threat to the United States.
This Part sheds light on CAFTA's negative effects on Central America's
environment and the ability of countries to improve their protection of natural
12 CEC, FREE TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 7, at 10.
13 James, supra note 11.
'4 CAFTA, supra note 2, art. 17.9.1.
5 See James, supra note 11.
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resources. CAFTA's Central American countries face growing environmental
degradation occurring rapidly throughout the region. There are numerous
critical environmental problems in the region. For example, one of the more
serious environmental concerns is deforestation. 6 From 1950 to 1990, Central
America lost more than 70% of its forest cover, and between 1980 and 1990,
deforestation occurred at rate of 1.4% annually. 7 Exacerbating the region's
environmental crisis is the fact that environmental degradation continues to
annihilate Central America's remarkable biodiversity. Despite accounting for
less than 1% of the earth's land mass, 8% of the planet's biodiversity is found
in Central America.' 8 Four out of the five CAFTA Central American countries
have tropical areas identified as "critical regions" requiring stringent
protection of biodiversity, and "[t]hree out of four migratory bird routes in the
Western Hemisphere pass through the DR-CAFTA countries, making the
forests in this tiny strip of land an essential habitat for the survival of 225
species of birds."' 9 The rapidly depleting biodiversity occurring in Central
America is not occurring in the United States, however, where environmental
regulations are relatively strict in comparison to other countries.
Notably, some distinctions between CAFTA countries and NAFTA
countries warrant an elevated degree of scrutiny in the assessment of CAFTA's
negative impact on the environments of the Central American countries.
Unlike NAFTA, CAFTA includes considerably "unequal trading partners;" the
combined gross domestic product of Central America is equal to 0.5% of the
U.S.'s gross domestic product. 2' Due to the disparity in economic resources
between the United States and the Central American countries, a lack of
uniformity likely exists in the environmental regulations between the trading
partners. Central America's insufficient financial resources necessary to
support effective environmental regulation present considerable risks in the
face of increased trade. Central American parties will not have the regulatory
capacity to address the increased development and investment facilitated by
CAFTA. John Audley and Vanessa Ulmer of the Carnegie Endowment for
6 Sierra Club, CAFTA's Impact on Central America's Environment, http://www.sierraclub.
org/trade/cafta/caftacentralamerica.asp (last visited on June 4, 2007).
17 Id.
18 Id.
9 Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Energy and Commerce
Comm., 109th Cong. 107 (2005) (prepared statement of David F. Waskow, Director of
International Programs, Friends of the Earth) [hereinafter Waskow, CAFTA Hearing].
20 WOLA, CAFTA, supra note 5.
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International Peace state, "[a]lthough the Central Americans are making
progress toward designing and implementing effective environmental laws, the
United States is already aware these laws may not yet be adequate and
certainly are not well enforced.",2 ' The USTR has expressly acknowledged the
weaknesses in environmental laws in Central American countries such as
Honduras and Guatemala.22 Despite progress in the address of the pressing
environmental issues such as deforestation, Central America's "ability to
effectively implement and enforce environmental laws is limited by the lack
of fiscal and human resources. 23  A majority of the Central American
countries "do not have appropriate regulations to implement their
environmental legislation... [and] [m]ost environmentally related laws in the
region have little or no implementing regulations, making enforcement a
difficult and sometimes impossible task."24
Due to the disparity of environmental regulation between the United States
and Central American countries, CAFTA presents countries with weak
regulatory schemes, like Honduras and Guatemala, as attractive locations for
factories and natural resource extraction. Environmental concerns over the
potential exploitation of Central America's natural resources partially stem
from the consequences of free trade under NAFTA. "[T]here is some evidence
that differences in environmental regulations between the NAFTA trading
partners is contributing to specific instances of pollution havens., 25 A stark
example of where environmental regulatory disparities between NAFTA's
parties led to pollution havens is the 400% increase in imports of hazardous
wastes from the United States to Canada since NAFTA was implemented in
2 John Audley & Vanessa Ulmer, Strengthening Linkages Between US. Trade Policy and
Environmental Capacity Building 16 (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Working Paper
No. 40, 2003), available at http://www.camegieendowment.org/files/wp40.pdf.
22 See UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (USTR), INTERIMENVIRONMENTALREVIEW:
U.S.-CENTRALAMERICA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 31 (2003), available at http://www.ustr.gov/
assets/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/asset upload_file946_3356.pdf[hereinafter USTR,
INTERIM ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW OF CAFTA] (stating that "Guatemala has not passed a wide
spectrum of environmental laws, and lacks specific laws dealing with the major issues of water,
forests, solid wastes, biodiversity, etc. that many of the other countries possess," and that
"Honduras also has a more limited slate of domestic environmental legislation..
23 Id. at 7.
24 See CAROLINA MAURI, SIXTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENTAL
COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE IN
CENTRALAMERICA 16-17 (2003), available at http://www.inece.org/conf/proceedings2/14-Env.
%20Law/o20Enforcement.pdf (stating that "[m]ost of the governmental officials and employees
that work on environmental issues do not have a formal training in this field..
25 CEC, FREE TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 7, at 3.
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1994.26 According to the Commission for Environmental Cooperation of
North America, this prodigious increase is due mainly to the "significant
difference in the cost of regulatory compliance between the two countries."27
It is important to note that NAFTA countries share geographical boundaries
which may allow for more transportation of hazardous wastes between the
United States, Canada, and Mexico, as compared to the distance between the
United States and Central American countries. However, this issue of
significant disparity between certain environmental regulations illustrates the
potential environmental problems which could occur under CAFTA. With
Central American countries lacking effective environmental regulations
relative to those of the United States, CAFTA could allow for further
exploitation by American companies of Central America's dwindling natural
habitats. Environments supporting rich biodiversity are threatened by
polluting factories, sprawling resort developments, increased logging of
ancient forests, and extractive industries that destroy the land and costal areas
alike.28
Additionally, opponents of CAFTA have argued that free trade agreements
have the effect of forcing exploitation of a country's resources by its own
citizens. For example, under NAFTA, the "subsidized dumping of corn into
Mexico has displaced many small farmers, and unfortunately, what that has led
to is increased deforestation rates as those farmers try to supplement their
incomes or to clear additional agricultural land when they are impoverished."29
Moreover, an additional result from the "dumping of subsidized U.S.
agricultural products" in Mexico under NAFTA, which could potentially occur
in Central America, is the increase in industrial farms that have elevated the
levels of nitrogen and pollution in Mexico.3"
Proponents of CAFTA have argued that economic development in CAFTA
countries will lead to improvements in environmental regulation. However,
it is important to remember that enhancement of environmental regulations is
not an automatic process, but rather a gradual one.3 Kevin Gallagher, of Tufts
26 Id. The 400% increase of hazardous waste imports is during the time period of 1994
to 2000. Id.
27 Id.
28 Sierra Club, Say"No" to NAFTA Expansion in Central America, available athttp://www.
sierraclub.org/trade/NAFTA/CAFTAfactsheet.pdf (last visited June 4, 2007).
29 Waskow, CAFTA Hearing, supra note 19, at I 10.
30 Id.
3 Interview by Steve Curwood with Kevin Gallagher, Boston University Economist, on
Living on Earth (July 8, 2005), available at http://www.loe.org/shows/segments.htm?program
[Vol. 35:545
ONE STEP FORWARD, Two STEPS BACK
Global Development and Environment Institute, explains that countries "need
to have the right kind of institutional structures in place to be able to foster the
market to be able to work better toward the environment."32 CAFTA countries,
notwithstanding the United States, may not have the adequate infrastructure
and environmental regulatory regime to cope with the "major transformation
that will occur in their econom[ies]" as a result of liberalizing trade under
CAFTA.33 For example, Gallagher argues that "Central American countries
are putting their eggs in the manufacturing basket. What they're really hoping
to do is create large scale, many worker assembly plants, mainly in the apparel
and textile industries, that will sell textiles and apparel into the US market. 3 4
An influx of populations will be migrating to the cities which are not prepared
for the massive increase in urban populations.35 Gallagher argues this is
exactly what happened in Mexico under NAFTA:
[y]ou have all sorts of new folks moving into the manufacturing
centers, you need water sanitization services, you need sewage,
you need roads to get people around, but also to buttress the air
pollution that could occur, so you get a real degraded makeshift
what we call sprawl around the central areas.36
CAFTA countries may experience similar detrimental effects from free
trade as Mexico has experienced under NAFTA. While the USTR argued that
"as wealth grows and poverty decreases, more resources become available for
environmental protection, with potential benefits for developing countries,""
this argument may oversimplify CAFTA's threat to the environment of Central
American developing countries. While economic development eventually
leads to enhanced regulation and improved sustainable development, more
immediate environmental degradation results as a consequence of increased
ID=05-P 1 3-00027&segmentlD=l %20.
32 Id.
33 Id.
" Id.; see also CEC, FREE TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 7, at 13 (discussing
studies that have shown "that differences in the enforcement of environmental regulations
between the US and Mexico have played a contributing role in the locational shift in textiles
production from the north to south").
31 Interview with Kevin Gallagher, supra note 3 1.
36 Id.
37 CAFTA FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW, supra note 7, at 29.
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trade and development. Central American countries do not have the present
capacity to offset these detrimental effects to the environment.38
IV. CAFTA's ENVIRONMENTAL CHAPTER
A. Is Chapter 17 an Improvement ofNAFTA?
Now, eleven years after implementation, the debate over NAFTA's impact
on the environment remains unresolved and future effects uncertain. 39 For
example, according to Kevin Gallagher, although "Mexico's estimated levels
of air, soil and water pollution, as well as solid waste, have all increased faster
than economic and population growth" under NAFTA, the agreement's
standards have "decelerated the deterioration of Mexico's environment.,
40
Regardless of the true extent of NAFTA's impact on the environment, the
widespread criticism of NAFTA's lack of environmental provisions has
resulted in an immense amount of pressure on subsequent free trade
agreements in which the United States has participated. Both the U.S.-Jordan
Free Trade Agreement signed on October 24, 2000 and the U.S.-Chile Free
Trade Agreement (U.S.-CFTA) that became effective on January 1, 2004
include environmental chapters in the text of each agreement-a step not taken
in NAFTA .4  Similar environmental pressure was placed on CAFTA parties
resulting in the inclusion of CAFTA's Chapter 17, an environmental chapter.42
This response to environmental concerns in CAFTA and in other free trade
31 See Interview with Kevin Gallagher, supra note 31 (stressing the need to address free
trade's impact on the environment of developing countries prior the point of economic
development at which countries "reach a sort of plateau where incomes get high enough where
the environment starts to improve on a per capita basis").
39 See CEC, FREE TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 7, at 4 (discussing the lack of
linear relationship between trade and the environment and both NAFTA's positive and negative
impacts on the environment and participating parties' environmental regulations).
' Kevin P. Gallagher, CAFTA and the Environment, PROVIDENCE JOURNAL, Apr. 11,2005,
available at http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/news/NewsTribuneGallagher.pdf; see also Kevin P.
Gallagher, Trading Away the Environment?, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 23, 2004, at B9, available at
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=-/c/a/2004/09/23/EDGHE8SM5M 1 .DTL&hw =
trading+away+the+environment&sn=009&sc=490 (reporting that Mexico "estimates that the
economic costs of environmental degradation as related to NAFTA have amounted to 10 percent
of annual GDP," which overwhelms the country's economic growth of 2.6% of the annual GDP).
41 Jay V. Sagar, Note, The Labor andEnvironment Chapters of the United States-Chile Free
Trade Agreement: An Improvement Over the Weak Enforcement Provisions of the NAFTA Side
Agreements on Labor and the Environment?, 21 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 913, 922 (2004).
42 CAFTA, supra note 2, art. 17.
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agreements is an attempt to follow obligations set forth in the United States
Trade Act of 2002,43 which "establishe[d] ... negotiating objectives and other
priorities relating to the environment."" The general environmental-related
trade negotiating objectives include, among others:
(1) ensuring that trade and environmental policies are mutually
supportive and to seek to protect and preserve the environment
and enhance the international means of doing so, while
optimizing the use of the world's resources; and (2) seeking
provisions in trade agreements under which parties to those
agreements strive to ensure that they do not weaken or reduce the
protections afforded in domestic environmental and labor laws as
an encouragement for trade.45
Proponents of CAFTA have portrayed Chapter 17 as a substantial step in
placing environmental concerns on equal footing with labor and economic
considerations in free trade agreements. Assistant U.S. Trade Representative,
Regina Vargo, boldly described Chapter 17 by stating: "We have also broken
new ground on the environmental side. . . .CAFTA['s] environmental
provisions.., are the most forward-leaning trade and environmental package
ever." '46 Despite this showing of concern for CAFTA's effects on the
environment, critics of CAFTA perceive Chapter 17 as a nominal gesture.
According to the Sierra Club, "the [Chapter 17] provisions unfortunately do
not have much teeth compared to other chapters of CAFTA [and] [w]hile there
is some environmentally-friendly language in the chapter, it is mostly
unenforceable. 47 Chapter 17 fails to provide an efficient mechanism for
environmental protection among CAFTA countries.48 The following Part
examines the most glaring weaknesses of CAFTA, exposing the agreement's
43 Trade Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C. § 3801 (2002).
44 CAFTA FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW, supra note 7, at 5.
41 Id. (citations omitted); see also KEVIN P. GALLAGHER, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L
PEACE, THE ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW OF THE FTAA: EXAMINING THE U.S. APPROACH 1-2
(2003), available at http://www.camegieendowment.org/files/TED_7.pdf. The Trade Act
requires the U.S. government to conduct an environmental review that analyzes the "potential
environmental benefits and costs of proposed trade agreements." Id. at 1.
46 Vargo, CAFTA Hearing, supra note 11, at 20.
"7 Sierra Club, CAFTA's Impact on Central America's Environment, supra note 16.
48 Letter from Central American Environmental Groups to United States Congress (May 11,
2005) (on file with author), available at http://www.sierraclub.org/trade/cafta/CAFTA regional
_engo.doc.
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failure to provide sufficient consideration to its potential negative impact on
the environment.
B. Enforcement of CAFTA's Environmental Provisions
CAFTA's Article 17.1 of the environmental chapter states:
Recognizing the right of each Party to establish its own levels of
domestic environmental protection and environmental
development policies and priorities, and to adopt or modify
accordingly its environmental laws and policies, each Party shall
ensure that its laws and policies provide for and encourage high
levels of environmental protection, and shall strive to continue to
improve those laws and policies.49
The explicit recognition of each party's "right" to establish its own levels of
protection is based on concerns of deference to national sovereignty. Without
clear deference to a country's right to govern itself, CAFTA could infringe
upon a country's sovereignty by forcing the participating parties to comply
with international environmental standards.5" Yet, by affording the countries
party to CAFTA broad discretion in environmental protection, it is unclear
how CAFTA will ensure countries will maintain or improve their existing laws
under Chapter 17's enforcement provisions. Although Article 17.2.1(a) states
a "Party shall not fail to effectively enforce its environmental laws,"'" in order
to constitute a "failure" the lack of enforcement must be "a sustained or
recurring course of action or inaction."52 Stated simply, "a one-time violation
may not be enough" for a party to be in violation of the agreement, regardless
of how egregious the violation may be.53
The environmental enforcement section, Article 17.2.1(b), continues to
weaken Article 17.1 's enumerated environmental responsibilities that "each
Party shall ensure that its laws and policies provide for and encourage high
levels of environmental protection."54  For example, Article 17.2.1(b)
recognizes that "each Party retains the right to exercise discretion with respect
4 CAFTA, supra note 2, art. 17.1.
o Sagar, supra note 41, at 918.
5' CAFTA, supra note 2, art. 17.2.1(a).
52 Id.
" Sierra Club, CAFTA's Impact on Central America's Environment, supra note 16.
14 CAFTA, supra note 2, art. 17.1 (emphasis added).
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to investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and compliance matters and to make
decisions regarding the allocation of resources to enforcement with respect to
other environmental matters determined to have higher priorities."5 Arguably,
providing such deference to each country's environmental enforcement
contradicts Article 17.1 's requirement that each country "ensure" substantial
environmental enforcement and protection. Collectively, Article 17.1-.2 can
be read as saying "you are supposed to enforce your environmental laws, but
only if you want to."56
Lacking in CAFTA's enforcement section is a set of basic environmental
laws and regulations each participating country must comply with and
maintain.57 Moreover, CAFTA countries are not required to adopt any
international environmental standards.58 As previously mentioned, it is unclear
how CAFTA ensures that countries maintain and work to improve their
environmental laws. Article 17.10 provides for future collaborative
environmental consultations, which ideally allow a party to challenge another
party's lack of enforcement of environmental laws or regulations. However,
Article 17.10.7 states: "No party may have recourse to dispute settlement under
this Agreement for any matter arising under any provision of this Chapter other
than Article 17.2.1(a)."59  In other words, one provision in CAFTA's
environmental chapter-that which requires CAFTA parties to enforce their
already existing environmental laws-is subject to dispute settlement where
penalties could be imposed on a violating country.6"
By limiting CAFTA's dispute settlement process to only disputes regarding
enforcement, the agreement allows for many areas of environmental law and
policy of member countries to go unchecked. For example, there is no
provision setting forth penalties or sanctions for countries that are allegedly
creating weak environmental laws in order to attract investment.6' Admittedly,
Article 17.2.2 states that the CAFTA countries "recognize that it is
inappropriate to encourage trade or investment by weakening or reducing the
s Id. art. 17.2.1(b).
s Sierra Club, CAFTA's Impact on Central America's Environment, supra note 16; cf
Sagar, supra note 41, at 919 (noting that NAFTA's environmental side agreements "have been
criticized for including weak enforcement provisions that are subject to political manipulation").
s7 Waskow, CAFTA Hearing, supra note 19, at 105-06.
58 James, supra note 11.
59 CAFTA, supra note 2, art. 17.10.7.
60 Waskow, CAFTA Hearing, supra note 19, at 107.
61 Sierra Club, CAFTA's Impact on Central America's Environment, supra note 16.
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protections afforded in domestic environmental laws."62  However, this
admonition to member countries is not incorporated into the enforcement
section in which a violation thereof is subject to dispute settlement.
Furthermore, the recognition of the potential to weaken environmental laws is
qualified in the immediately subsequent Article 17.2.3, which states,
"[n]othing in this Chapter shall be construed to empower a Party's authorities
to undertake environmental law enforcement activities in the territory of
another Party."63
Without explicit standards, and compounded by the loose language of
Chapter 17, it is unclear as to what level of egregiousness a failure to enforce
will warrant a penalty under the CAFTA.' By limiting dispute resolution to
allegations of another country's digression of environmental enforcement,
CAFTA creates loopholes for participating countries.6" In the interests of
pursuing an investment, a country could pass a weak environmental regulation
which could not be challenged in dispute settlement under Chapter 17.
Exacerbating this seemingly large loophole is the broad discretionary language
in Article 17.2.1(b) stating, "the Parties understand that a Party is in
compliance ... where a course of action or inaction reflects a reasonable
exercise of such discretion, or results from a bonafide decision regarding the
allocation of resources."66 By affording this immense amount of discretion to
each party and by restricting the availability of a dispute resolution forum,
"CAFTA allows countries to decide not to enforce any portion of their
environmental ... law by deciding to allocate resources elsewhere"; these
decisions are not subject to dispute settlement.67 Additionally, CAFTA's
environmental chapter does not apply to domestic judicial decisions and thus
allows a country's "repeated failures by a country's court system to enforce
environmental laws" to stand undisputed.68
6 CAFTA, supra note 2, art. 17.2.2.
63 Id. art. 17.2.3.
64 See QUIXOTE CENTER/QUEST FOR PEACE, FAIRTRADE ORFREE TRADE? UNDERSTANDING
CAFTA 16 (2003), http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/mtoups/cafta-briefingfinal dec03.pdf
("Allowing for some degree of discretion is not itself a problem - and no doubt necessary to
reach an agreement. However, the text is so broadly worded that it would be difficult to force
a decision on non-compliance, should a conflict ever reach dispute settlement.").
65 Id. at 16-17.
66 CAFTA, supra note 2, art. 17.2. 1(b) (emphasis in original).
67 Citizens Trade Campaign, Key Environmental Reasons to Oppose CAFTA, http://www.
citizenstrade.org/pdf/Key/20Environmental%20Reasons%20to%200ppose%20CAFTA.pdf
(last visited June 5, 2007).
68 Waskow, CAFTA Hearing, supra note 19, at 107.
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When analyzing CAFTA's environmental provisions, like the enforcement
provision under Article 17.2, it is important to keep in mind the existing
environmental regulations and enforcement regimes of the participating
countries. The USTR has recognized that Central American countries have
weak environmental laws and lack sufficient resources for effective
enforcement.69 Without provisions in CAFTA mandating countries to adopt
certain environmental laws, there is a lack of incentive to improve existing
laws when less stringent environmental regulations attract foreign investment.
Article 17.13 first draws a traditionally, and relatively broad (though
ambiguous), definition of environmental law.70 Yet, the definition of
"environmental law" becomes increasingly restrictive by limiting the term to
involve 1) environmental contaminants; 2) chemical products and toxic wastes;
and 3) protection of conservation of wild flora and fauna.7' This restrictive
definition excludes other important areas of environmental law such as water
and soil conservation. The exclusion of such environmental issues essentially
precludes any challenge to a country's lack of enforcement of laws dealing
with these environmental issues because they do not fall within the CAFTA
definition of "environmental law., 72
Arguably worse than failing to set basic recognized standards for
environmental protection, CAFTA's Chapter 17 definition section
affirmatively presents the opportunity for exploitation of natural resources.
Article 17.13.1 states, "environmental law does not include any statute or
regulation, or provision thereof, the primary purpose of which is managing the
commercial harvest or exploitation, or subsistence or aboriginal harvesting, of
natural resources. 73 Basically, the CAFTA mandate that countries "ensure
that [their] laws.., encourage high levels of environmental protection"74 does
not apply to those laws whose "primary purpose" is natural resource
69 See generally USTR, INTERIM ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW OF CAFTA, supra note 22.
70 See Letter from Central American Environmental Groups to United States Congress, supra
note 48; see also CAFTA, supra note 2, art. 17.13.1.
71 CAFTA, supra note 2, art. 17.13.1.
72 Letter from Central American Environmental Organizations to United States Congress
(May 11, 2005), available at http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/cafta/3046.html
(arguing that the definition "severely restricts that which is referred to as 'environmental
legislation' if we compare it, for example with Costa Rica's Organic Environmental Law
(No. 7554)," which includes "a broad array of crucial issues ... such as water usage and
conservation, the sovereign management of biological diversity, soil protection and the
administration of energy resources").
" CAFTA, supra note 2, art. 17.13.1 (bold type omitted).
74 Id. art. 17.1.
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management involving precious resources such as timber, water, and natural
minerals." This exclusionary definition of "environmental law" makes it
easier for Central American countries to relax their natural resource protection
laws in order to attract foreign companies interested in exploiting natural
resources.7 6 Moreover, there is a lack of incentive to "strive to ensure"
effective laws intended to protect natural resources since "weakening
environmental laws in order to attract investment cannot become subject of an
arbitral panel."77
C. Fines for Chapter 17 Violations
In the event a dispute settlement concludes a country has failed to enforce
its environmental laws, the maximum fine is $15 million annually.78 This
monetary penalty appears to undermine Assistant USTR Regina Vargo's
description of CAFTA as "the most forward-leaning trade and environmental
package ever,"" considering sanctions for commercial provisions violations
are unlimited. If a country is fined for failure to enforce its environmental
laws, the monetary penalty is supposed to be returned to the violating country
for the purposes of enhancing its enforcement.8" Yet CAFTA's provisions
"do[ ] not prohibit a violating country from redirecting its existing funds away
from the area where funds [from the penalty] are being [placed]. .. " Thus,
a penalty imposed due to a country's lack of enforcement could potentially
result in "no net increase in enforcement funding."82  In effect, dispute
settlement penalties may not act as a deterrent nor as a means of improvement
71 Waskow, CAFTA Hearing, supra note 19, at 107.
76 See INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, MODERNIZATION OF THE STATE: STRATEGY
DOCUMENT 8 (2003), availableathttp://www.iadb.org/sds/doc/ModemizationStateStrategy.pdf.
In analyzing sustainable development in Latin American countries, it is important to note that
historically, much of the region's economic development has depended on natural resource
extraction. Id.
7" Citizens Trade Campaign, supra note 67.
78 CAFTA, supra note 2, art. 20.17.2.
79 Vargo, CAFTA Hearing, supra note 11, at 25.
80 CAFTA, supra note 2, art. 20.17.4 ("Assessments shall be paid into a fund established by
the Commission and shall be expended at the direction of the Commission for appropriate labor
or environmental initiatives, including efforts to improve or enhance labor or environmental law
enforcement, as the case may be, in the territory of the Party complained against, consistent with
its law.").
S1 Sierra Club, CAFTA's Impact on Central America's Environment, supra note 16.
82 Id.; CAFTA, supra note 2, art. 20.17.4.
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of existing ineffective enforcement in Central American countries where the
enhancement of environmental laws is crucial in the context of increasing
foreign investment and development.83
V. INVESTOR SUITS
A. The Relation Between Investor Suits and the Environment
Since environmental interests often conflict with economic ones, inevitably
a country's domestic environmental laws may be at odds with foreign
investments in that particular country.84 A free trade agreement's "investor
suits" offer protection of foreign investments by providing investors the right
to "seek money damages in private international arbitration against the national
government of the country in which they are investing."85 CAFTA's Chapter
10 investor suit provision is arguably the most controversial provision with
environmental implications. Article 10.7 states, "[n]o Party may expropriate
or nationalize a covered investment either directly or indirectly through
measures equivalent to expropriation or nationalization.... "86 An exception
to this proscription of expropriation is that a country may expropriate an
investment for a public purpose in a non-discriminatory manner.87 In the
scenario where appropriation has occurred, compensation must be paid to the
investing party that is "equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated
investment immediately before the expropriation took place . ... "88
Similar to NAFTA's Chapter 11, CAFTA's Chapter 10 investor suit
provisions provide "foreign investors with guarantees that their investments
will be protected against expropriation, denial of treatment required by
" See, e.g., Sierra Club, Faces of Trade: New Gold Rush Revives Old "Development"
Model, http://www.sierraclub.org/trade/faces/pacific rim.asp (last visited June 5, 2007)
(presenting examples of the implications of mining industry in Central America which "cause
health and ecological damage, but under the banners of democracy and trade, these projects are
imposed on poor and unprotected countries").
84 See Sanford E. Gaines, Protecting Investors, Protecting the Environment: The Unexpected
Story of NAFTA Chapter 11, in GREENING NAFTA: THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 173 (David L. Markell & John H. Knox eds., 2003).
85 Judith Wallace, Note, Corporate Nationality, Investment Protection Agreements, and
Challenges to Domestic Natural Resources Law: The Implications of Glamis Gold's NAFTA
Chapter 11 Claim, 17 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 365, 366 (2005).
86 CAFTA, supra note 2, art. 10.7.1.
87 Id. art. 10.7.1(a)-(d).
11 Id. art. 10.7.2(b).
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international law, and discriminatory treatment by the government of the
country in which they are investing." 9 A more skeptical perspective is that
investor suit provisions allow foreign investors to bypass domestic courts in
CAFTA countries by filing a claim and seeking money damages in an
international arbitration tribunal that "operate[s] outside a nation's regular
legal system .. ."90
Proponents of investor suit provisions emphasize that the "promotion of
cross-border investments [is] an 'essential element' "in negotiating free trade
agreements.9 Proponents also argue investments in foreign countries
facilitated by free trade agreements provide assistance in assuring sustainable
development and improving effective environmental regulations.9" In order to
attract investments through free trade agreements, "national and international
rules must substantially reduce the 'regulatory risk' that the investment will
be... appropriated by the host government without compensation."93 Foreign
and U.S. companies demand protection for their investments that could be
vulnerable, "usually in less developed countries with less transparent and
impartial courts."'94 Also, foreign investors require international protections
provided for by investor suit provisions because foreign corporations are not
adequately represented in the political processes of the "host country."95
Hence, proponents of the investment provisions of NAFTA and CAFTA
contend that these provisions allow access to binding arbitration without
"pressuring the investor's home government to resolve the dispute through
diplomatic bargaining."96
Critics of both NAFTA and CAFTA's investor suit provisions focus on the
expansive powers given to private corporations. Speaking before Congress,
89 Wallace, supra note 85, at 366. Compare NAFTA, supra note 4, ch. 11, with CAFTA,
supra note 2, ch. 10.
90 Sierra Club, NAFTA's Investor Rights: A Threat to the Environment and Our Democracy,
http://www.sierraclub.org/trade/nafta/backgrounder.asp (last visited June 5, 2007); CAFTA,
supra note 2, art. 10.16.
9" See Gaines, supra note 84, at 175 (describing similar investment interests of the United
States, Canada, and Mexico during NAFTA negotiations).
92 Id. at 184 (emphasizing "foreign direct investment has dwarfed official development
assistance as an engine of development throughout the world, so development policies in
countries like Mexico have focused on attracting foreign investment").
93 Id. at 190.
94 Wallace, supra note 85, at 373.
9' See Gaines, supra note 84, at 188.
96 Scott R. Jablonski, NAFTA Chapter 11 Dispute Resolution and Mexico: A Healthy Mix
of International Law, Economics and Politics, 32 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 475, 477 (2004).
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David F. Waskow, Director of International Programs for Friends of the Earth,
stated, "Using these rules, which provide foreign investors broad rights that do
not exist under U.S. or other countries' laws, multinational investors have been
able to demand compensation for the implementation of legitimate
environmental protections. 97 Opponents of the investor suit provisions in free
trade agreements recognize that the promotion of foreign investment is integral
to the encouragement of sustainable development and the conservation of the
environment and its useful resources.98 However, in order for "international
investment to contribute to achieving development that is sustainable [i.e.,
environmentally friendly], governments will have to continue helping set the
legal and economic context in which investment takes place."9 9 Allowing
investors to challenge a country's environmental laws may deter a country
from developing sufficient environmental regulations because of the pressure
and need to attract and accommodate economic development. Also, investor
suits can require governments to pay compensation to investors whose
activities at issue have detrimental effects on the environment as well as on a
country's "public health and welfare."' ° The criticisms of CAFTA's investor
suit provisions in Chapter 10 are in part based on investor suits arising under
NAFTA.
B. Investor Suits Under NAFTA
Despite investor suits being one of CAFTA's most contentious areas of
debate, the similar provision in NAFTA's Chapter 11 did not receive a lot of
attention from environmentalists during debates over NAFTA.'0° Chapter 11
97 Waskow, CAFTA Hearing, supra note 19, at 108; see also James, supra note 11
(commenting on the expansive rights NAFTA's Chapter 11 affords to private investors to the
extent that it has "undermined the sovereignty of democratically elected governments, and their
ability to act in the public interest" and has served as a "virtual Bill of Rights for corporations").
98 INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., PRIVATE RIGHTS, PUBLIC PROBLEMS: A GUIDE TO
NAFTA's CONTROVERSIAL CHAPTER ON INVESTOR RIGHTS vii (2001), available at http://
motherlode.sierraclub.org/fairTrade/Nafta%20citizens-guide.pdf [hereinafter IISD].
99 Id.
100 Id. at 1.
0' Gaines, supra note 84, at 173, 191 n.1 ("Among the public interest commentaries on
NAFTA before it was approved, only a Canadian group perceived that Chapter 11 might put
limits on a 'government's ability to initiate new public programs' and would 'reduce democratic
control of the economy.' "); see also IISD, supra note 98, at 7 (stating that the United States,
Canada, and Mexico all "embraced the goal of attracting new foreign investment").
2007]
GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
makes only three references to environmental issues," 2  including
Article 1114's "Environmental Measures," which says that member states
"recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing...
environmental measures."'' 3 However, by 2002, close to a third of NAFTA
investor suits concerned "environmental activities or environmental protection
measures."104
In 1996, Ethyl v. Canada was the first case of a foreign investor initiating
arbitration under Chapter I l's investor suits.'0 5 The Virginia-based Ethyl
Corporation was the sole supplier of manganese-based gasoline additive,
MMT. 10 6 Although not conclusive, studies had shown that MMT had the
potential to cause certain health risks as well as "interfer[ing] with the
operation of pollution-controlling catalytic converters."' 7 In 1995, Canada
passed the Manganese Fuel Additives Act, which essentially prevented Ethyl
Corporation from selling MMT in Canada.
Due to the lack of a sufficient scientific basis for the ban on MMT and
domestic pressures to rescind the ban, Canada signed a settlement with Ethyl
Corporation in 1998.108 Canada not only rescinded its ban, but also paid Ethyl
Corporation $13 million, including legal fees and lost profits for the time the
ban was in effect.'0 9 Canada lacked sufficient scientific proof to support its
ban on MMT and withstand a foreign investor suit by Ethyl Corporation, yet
the case illustrates the potency of the foreign investor suits and their potential
to effectively undermine domestic laws directed towards the protection of
public health and the environment.
In contrast, others have viewed Canada's ban on MMT in Ethyl v. Canada
as "disingenuous" and believe the environment minister deliberately avoided
making a science-based regulatory decision.'10 Moreover, the case is a perfect
example of the necessity of free trade agreements to provide protection for
foreign investors who lack representation in a country's political and legal
processes."' Proponents of NAFTA's investor suit provisions "claim that
102 IISD, supra note 98, at 12.
103 NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1114(2).
104 Gaines, supra note 84, at 173.
"' IISD, supra note 98, at 15.
106 Gaines, supra note 84, at 182.
107 Id.
10s Id. at 182-83.
109 Id. at 183.
1o Id. at 182-83.
111 Id.
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critics' concerns are overblown, and emphasize that, unlike Canada and
Mexico, the United States has yet to lose one of these cases."' 1 2 According to
Sanford E. Gaines, an international environmental and trade law professor at
the University of Houston Law Center, cases like Ethyl v. Canada "support the
view that Chapter 11 is functioning precisely as intended, protecting foreign
investors who, as politically vulnerable outsiders, have fallen victim to unfair
or arbitrary treatment by governments acting on short-term, locally based
political motivations." ' 
3
Notwithstanding the need for protection of foreign investment, the influx
of Chapter 11 suits following Ethyl v. Canada have involved individual private
investors challenging domestic environmental laws intended to protect a
nation's natural resources. For example, in 2001, Metaclad Corporation, a
California-based waste disposal company, received an arbitration award of
$16.7 million in compensation from Mexico. 1' After Metaclad had purchased
an existing hazardous waste transfer facility and began constructing a landfill
on the site, the Mexican government closed "the site after a geological audit
showed the facility would contaminate the local water supply ...[and]
declared the site part of a 600,000-acre ecological zone."'" 5 Even though the
creation of the ecological zone was premised on legitimate reasons including
the protection of a rare cactus species, the Chapter 11 arbitration panel found
that restrictions placed on the site were "tantamount to expropriation of
Metaclad's good faith investment in its facility."' 16
Since Ethyl v. Canada, Canada and Mexico have paid millions of dollars
from losing arbitration claims or legal fees in defending domestic
environmental regulations in arbitration tribunals." 7 In the process, NAFTA
countries have had to defend legitimate environmental regulations intended to
protect public welfare and natural resources. For example, in 2003, a
Canadian gold mining company, Glamis Gold Ltd., filed a Chapter 11 claim
against the United States. Glamis Gold contended that certain California laws
,"2 Daphne Eviatar, A Toxic Trade-Off, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2005, at BI.
113 Gaines, supra note 84, at 189.
"14 Sierra Club, NAFTA's Investor Rights: A Threat to the Environment and Our Democracy,
supra note 90.
115 Id.
..6 Gaines, supra note 84, at 179-80 (explaining that the "[e]nvironmental critics of
Chapter 11 see Metaclad as a case where a company failed to win local consent to the siting of
its facility, built the facility anyway, and then claimed compensation when the local officials...
block[ed] operation of the facility because of its threat to the local environment").
"7 Waskow, CAFTA Hearing, supra note 19, at 108.
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regulating mining that were passed after the company received a federal permit
to mine would destroy its profit margins. 18 Originally, the U.S. Department
of Interior rejected Glamis Gold's project due to the risks of toxic chemicals
leaking into the surrounding water sources and because the site was on land
that had critical cultural and religious importance to the Quechan Native
American tribe." 9
Unfortunately, in 2001, the Bush administration's secretary of the interior
rescinded the prior denial of the permit to Glamis.' 20 In response, California
passed legislation in 2003 that "required the backfilling and restoration of
mining sites to pre-mining conditions if the mines are near sacred Native
American sites...."121 Glamis seeks $50 million, including the $14.3 million
for purchasing the site and $35.7 million in compensation of projected lost
profits from the site. 22 Although the case has not been resolved, it shows the
reach of investor suits.
Under NAFTA's Chapter 11 (and now under CAFTA's investor
provisions), one foreign company can have a costly effect on the ability of a
country to protect its environment. Moreover, NAFTA critics argue that the
use of Chapter 11 suits by foreign investors has changed from using investor
protections as "a protective 'shield' to a strategic, aggressive 'sword.' ,123 In
regard to the apparent abuse of Chapter 11 suits by foreign investors, Dr.
Howard Mann, an international lawyer specializing in environmental trade and
investment elements of international sustainable development law and an
associate with the International Institute for Sustainable Development, states:
Investment agreements have traditionally been thought of as
recourses of last resort, aimed at protecting an investor through
extraordinary means in extraordinary circumstances. Under
Chapter 11, however, these provisions are now being turned into
a means to fend off proposed new regulations, lobby for or
against specific government actions, and generally to preserve or
gain a competitive position. Threats to use Chapter 11 are now
1' PATRICK WOODALL, SIERRA CLUB, WHEN BAD THINGS HAPPEN TO GOOD LAWS: How
INTERNATIONAL TRADE PACTS THREATEN CALIFoRmA's ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS 4 (2004),
available at http://www.sierraclub.org/trade/califomia/CATradeReport.pdf.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 5.
122 Id.
123 IISD, supra note 98, at 16.
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a routine lobbying instrument, and are given added impact by the
broad scope tribunals have given the obligations in the initial
cases. This fundamental shift-from protective shield to
strategic weapon-means that the drafters of future investment
agreements must carefully consider how the provisions can be
used not just to protect the investor, but also as a strategic
weapon against a government when investor interests are
affected.
24
The makeup of NAFTA's investor suit provisions has arguably led to the
use of investor suits in ways antithetical to their intended purpose. For
example, arbitration panels under NAFTA have no strict standard for
determining whether an investor meets the necessary nationality qualifications.
Some have suggested that arbitration panels use the "place in incorporation"
test, which requires only that a parent company be incorporated under the laws
of a NAFTA party.'2 Essentially, this test does not require any substantial
connections to a country such as operations in the country of nationality. This
"easy-to-meet nationality test" can potentially allow domestic companies to
challenge domestic environmental regulations by gaining "access to a special
forum and to arguably greater rights which are supposed to be conditioned on
nationality."' 126 An example of the problems with a weak nationality test in
NAFTA, and now CAFTA tribunals, is exhibited in the case of Glamis Gold:
Th[e] problem is highlighted by the fact that only a company
organized under the law of a U.S. state has the right to a hardrock
mining claim on U.S. federal land, yet only a Canadian or
Mexican investor has the right to make a claim under NAFTA
Chapter 1 1 against the United States. Glamis Gold claims mining
rights available only to U.S. citizens as well as the NAFTA-based
rights available only to foreign investors. 2
7
The lack of a strict nationality standard invites companies to reorganize in
order to be able to pursue Chapter 11 suits. Access to a tribunal allows a
124 Id.
.25 Wallace, supra note 85, at 366.
'26 Id. at 368 (citing the case of Glamis Gold Ltd. as an example of where a Canadian parent
corporation met the nationality test because California's laws "expropriated its investment made
via its American subsidiary").
127 Id. at 368-69.
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company "the opportunity to circumvent U.S. courts or to relitigate
unsuccessful claims ... offer[ing] the opportunity for money damages that
would be unavailable in U.S. courts."' 1
28
Among other weaknesses of NAFTA's investor suits provisions is the
manipulation of the term "expropriation" in Article 1110.129 NAFTA's
arbitration panels have used traditional international law as opposed to a "law
of NAFTA or U.S. law on takings," resulting in a much broader and investor-
friendly definition of property interest. 3 ' By offering an expansive range in
which a country's environmental regulations can affect an investor's property
values or anticipated profits, investors can avoid a more stringent domestic law
such as the U.S.'s regulatory takings rules.' Although attempts have been
made by the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation
(NAAEC) to narrow and clarify NAFTA's "expropriation" provisions in order
to quell attacks on domestic environmental laws, there has been little progress
due to powerful political forces influencing the status quo.132
Further weaknesses of NAFTA's investor suit provisions are addressed
below in the discussion on CAFTA's investor suit provisions.
VI. ARE CAFTA'S INVESTOR SUIT PROVISIONS AN IMPROVEMENT?
A. Same Old Investor Suit Story
Again, there is widespread disagreement on whether CAFTA's investor suit
provisions are an improvement on NAFTA, or if CAFTA's Chapter 10 is
merely "a potential extension of the failures of NAFTA."'33 In its Final
Environmental Review published in February 22, 2005, the USTR outlines
CAFTA's "substantive clarifications and procedural innovations" made to
128 Id. at 374.
129 NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1110(1) (stating "[n]o Party shall directly or indirectly...
expropriate an investment of an investor or another Party in its territory or take a measure
tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an investment").
130 See, e.g., Wallace, supra note 85, at 382 (citing Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Award in
Respect to Damages, May 31, 2002, para. 96-101) (stating the panel "hearing a challenge to
Canada's ban on PCB exports found that market share is a protected property interest").
13' See Sierra Club, Say "No" to NAFTA Expansion in Central America, supra note 28.
132 Id.
133 Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. on Energy and Commerce
Comm., 109th Cong. 131 (2005) (prepared statement ofLori Wallach, Director, Citizen's Global
Trade Watch) [hereinafter Wallach, CAFTA Hearing].
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NAFTA's investment chapter in light of NAFTA's apparent weaknesses. 134
However, CAFTA does not address the aforementioned concerns over
NAFTA's lack of stringent nationality requirements which are susceptible to
abuse. CAFTA replicates NAFTA's definition of an "investor of a Party" as
a "Party or state enterprise thereof, or a national or an enterprise of a Party,
that attempts to make, is making, or has made an investment in the territory of
another Party. . .. ""' Also, similar to NAFTA, CAFTA sets no strict
standards limiting the definition of an "investor." This vague term could allow
investors who do not necessarily meet CAFTA's intended nationality
requirement to challenge legitimate environmental laws in CAFTA
countries. 13
The USTR claims the expropriation provisions in CAFTA's Chapter 10
"have been clarified in an annex to ensure that they are consistent with U.S.
legal principles and practice, including a clarification that nondiscriminatory
regulatory actions designed and applied to protect the public welfare
(including environmental protection) do not constitute indirect appropriation
'except in rare circumstances."" 37 The USTR is referring to CAFTA's Annex
10-C, which does offer a more precise definition of "expropriation" than
NAFTA's definition in Article 11 1 0.138 CAFTA provides an outline of factors
to consider when determining whether there has been an indirect expropriation
of an investor's properties. Indirect expropriation occurs "where an action or
series of actions by a Party has an effect equivalent to direct expropriation
without formal transfer of title or outright seizure." '139
CAFTA's listed factors used to determine whether an indirect expropriation
has taken place are based on the regulatory takings analysis set forth in Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.14 0 These factors include:
(i) the economic impact of the government action, although the
fact that an action or series of actions by a Party has an adverse
effect on the economic value of an investment, standing alone,
134 CAFTAFINALENVIRONMENTALREVIEW, supra note 7, at 30; see also CAFTA, supra note
2, annex 10-C.
"' Compare CAFTA, supra note 2, art. 10.28, with NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1139.
136 See IISD, supra note 98, at 23-24.
137 CAFTA FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW, supra note 7, at 30.
138 Compare CAFTA, supra note 2, annex 10-C, with NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 11 10.
139 CAFTA, supra note 2, annex 10-C.4(a).
140 438 U.S. 104 (1978); see also CAFTA FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW, supra note 7, at
2007]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
does not establish that an indirect expropriation has occurred; (ii)
the extent to which the government action interferes with distinct,
reasonable investment-backed expectations; and (iii) the
character of the government action.'
41
CAFTA' s inclusion of the Penn Central analysis expressly provides guidelines
that are lacking in NAFTA and could serve as a limitation on investors
attacking legitimate domestic environmental law in CAFTA countries.
However, critics have argued this U.S. takings analysis is taken "out of context
... ignoring many key Constitutional principles."' 42 When an American court
applies the Penn Central analysis in a regulatory takings case, it has other case
law to provide insight and further assistance in determining whether
governmental action constitutes a regulatory taking requiring compensation.
Yet, an arbitration panel that follows international law will not have this
contextual background and large amount of case law to assist it in accurately
applying the Penn Central factors to a particular CAFTA case.
Moreover, under NAFTA, investors have prevailed on takings claims that
would not have been permitted under U.S. law.' 43 Thus, if CAFTA tribunals
follow in the steps of NAFTA tribunals in takings cases, then rulings on
indirect expropriation may potentially conflict with the legal principles
surrounding the Penn Central analysis. Essentially, the factors listed in
CAFTA's Annex 10-C expropriation section intended to limit investor claims
will lose their effect. Lori Wallach, Director for Citizen's Global Trade
Watch, has argued that the CAFTA provisions are far less than sufficient:
CAFTA includes the NAFTA language that requires foreign
investors be compensated for "indirect expropriation." This
provision has been the basis for an array of cases that would not
be permitted under U.S. law, including regulatory takings
cases. . . . Several additional CAFTA provisions promote
regulatory takings cases not allowed under U.S. law. For
instance, the Supreme Court has ruled that "mere diminution in
the value of property, however serious, is insufficient to
141 CAFTA, supra note 2, annex 1-C.4(a)(i)-(iii).
142 Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, The Problem with NAFTA's Chapter 11 Investor Suit
Rules Has Not Been Fixed in CAFTA, http://www.sierraclub.org/trade/cafta/chapterI I-rules.
pdf (last visited June 6, 2007).
"' Wallach, CAFTA Hearing, supra note 133, at 127.
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demonstrate a taking" and that the entire property must be
affected permanently. In contrast, NAFTA Chapter 1 1 tribunals
have found that a government action need only cause
"significant" or "substantial" impairment of an investment's
value to qualify as a taking.' 44
CAFTA does not remedy this overly-broad definition of "indirect
expropriation," leaving the United States vulnerable to investors sidestepping
U.S. courts in an attempt to gain more rights in a CAFTA tribunal where a U.S.
law is challenged.
The USTR also notes that CAFTA's expropriation guidelines in Annex 10-
C clarify that a government's actions intended to protect the environment do
not constitute indirect expropriation "except in rare circumstances.' '45 This
"rare circumstances" limitation sounds great; however, Lori Wallach states,
"this language has precisely the opposite effect claimed .... [as it] enshrines
the right of foreign investors to challenge a wide array of ... regulations not
subject to U.S. taking claims."' 146 Only the tribunal has the power to determine
whether an indirect expropriation claim falls within "rare circumstances."'47
The United States is powerless when a domestic environmental regulation is
challenged under CAFTA despite the fact that "U.S. law safeguards all public
interest regulations governing personal property.... "48 A country may spend
millions defending what it holds as a legitimate environmental regulation
intended to protect the environment and the public welfare. 149 In contrast, a
foreign investor suit is "low-risk and low-cost to the plaintiff at the early stages
of litigation. . . . [and] because there is no equivalent to the motion for
summary judgment to quickly screen out meritless claims, defending
governments must devote resources to mount a defense on the merits to even
the most specious claims."' 5
'4 Id. (citations omitted).
141 CAFTA FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW, supra note 7, at 30; see also CAFTA, supra
note 2, annex 10-C.4(b).
146 Wallach, CAFTA Hearing, supra note 133, at 127.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Wallace, supra note 85, at 383 (commenting on the weakness in NAFTA's investor
provisions).
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B. A Few Improvements to Investor Suits
CAFTA does provide innovations to NAFTA that will assist countries in
protecting their environmental laws from investor suit challenges. The USTR
argues that CAFTA has sufficient provisions that address the above-mentioned
risk of frivolous investor claims. 5' CAFTA provides a procedure in which a
country can move to dismiss a frivolous claim, and a tribunal is authorized to
award attorney's fees and costs if the tribunal determines there is a lack of
jurisdiction or there is a failure to state a claim.'52 Yet, CAFTA does not
provide for any penalties or sanctions to be imposed on an investor bringing
a claim in bad faith. Also, the fact that there is no judicial review further
illustrates the disparity of risks between a foreign investor who has nothing to
lose in bringing a suit and that of a CAFTA country whose legitimate
environmental regulation is in jeopardy.'53
One of the most important procedural additions to CAFTA that is absent in
NAFTA is the provision allowing an "increased transparency in the investor-
State mechanism."' 54  In contrast to the relative secrecy of investor suit
arbitration proceedings under NAFTA, CAFTA's Article 10.21 requires that
documents submitted to the panel be promptly made available to the public and
hearings are also open to the public.'55 Also, amicus curiae briefs can be
submitted to the arbitration panel.'56 These provisions, which open investor-
State suits to public scrutiny, have the potential to provide a much needed
avenue for the environmental advocates to exert more influence in arbitration
decisions where environmental regulations are threatened.
'51 CAFTA FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW, supra note 7, at 31.
152 CAFTA, supra note 2, art. 10.20.
'13 See generally CAFTA, supra note 2, art. 10; Wallace, supra note 85, at 384 (commenting
that "[u]nder the New York Convention, federal courts are required to enforce these judgments
unless there is fraud, [or] noncompliance with the agreement.. ., but a court cannot review the
award on the merits"). But see CAFTA, supra note 2, annex 10-F (providing for an appellate
panel: Parties "[w]ithin three months of the date of entry into force of this Agreement, the
Commission shall establish a Negotiating Group to develop an appellate body or similar
mechanism to review awards rendered by tribunals under this Chapter").
154 CAFTA FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW, supra note 7, at 31.
"' CAFTA, supra note 2, art. 10.21.1-.2.
156 Id. art. 10.20.3.
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ONE STEP FORWARD, Two STEPS BACK
VII. CONCLUSION
Under CAFTA, foreign investment in Central America will stimulate
economic growth in countries where the lack of financial resources is a leading
cause of environmental degradation. Unfortunately, concerns with CAFTA's
potential negative impact on the environment were apparently deflected by the
general assertion that the agreement will ultimately lead to enhanced
environmental protection. It is clear from the above analysis that despite small
improvements to NAFTA's environmental provisions, CAFTA inadequately
addresses the environmental implications of the free trade CAFTA is intended
to facilitate.
CAFTA's environmental chapter is an improvement from NAFTA's lack
thereof, but the inclusion of an environmental chapter is close to moot if it
does not provide sufficient measures to ensure the agreement will further
environmental conservation rather than discourage it. Without clear-cut
minimum environmental standards imposed on CAFTA parties, Chapter 17
does not create incentives for developing Central American countries to
improve their environmental laws. There is even less of an incentive when
these countries need, and are attempting, to attract foreign investment.
Unfortunately, CAFTA's investor suit provisions in Chapter 10 exacerbate the
problem of countries maintaining weak enforcement in order to attract foreign
investment. Despite CAFTA's improvements to NAFTA's investor suit
provisions, Chapter 10 continues the trend of allowing investors to use investor
suits as means of undermining legitimate domestic environmental laws. Since
CAFTA did not narrow the restrictions on investor suits, U.S. environmental
laws intended to protect the environment and the public welfare are still at risk
of being challenged by a foreign investor; however, it may take more than one
arbitration loss for the United States to comprehend the broad implications of
CAFTA's investor suits. In contrast, an investor suit under CAFTA could
have devastating economic effects on one of the poorer, developing Central
American countries.
CAFTA has followed NAFTA's lead in not placing environmental
considerations on equal terms with trade and investment interests. Without
sufficient safeguards in CAFTA, Central American environments could likely
suffer irreparable harm before the intended benefits from free trade manifest.
CAFTA is a step forward in incorporating adequate environmental measures
in free trade agreements. Yet, these improvements are clearly insufficient and
jeopardize the immediate fate of the environment in Central America and the
environmental laws of all CAFTA countries.
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